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Prospective Overruling Unravelled 
SAMUEL BESWICK*
Judges have a dual role: they decide cases and they determine the law. These 
functions are conventionally understood to be intertwined: adjudication leads to 
case law, and disputes over judge-made laws lead to adjudication. Because 
judgments involve the resolution of past disputes, judge-made law is 
retrospective. The retrospective nature of judicial law-making can seem to work 
an injustice in hard cases. It appears unfair and inefficient for novel judicial 
decisions to apply to conduct occurring prior to the date judgment is handed 
down. A proposed solution is to separate the law-making and adjudicatory 
functions of courts. This is the technique of “prospective overruling”. Utilising 
this technique, courts seek to change the law prospectively for future cases, 
while continuing to decide past disputes under the “old” legal rule that was 
thought to apply at the time those disputes arose. This article challenges the 
claims that the exceptional juridical technique of prospective overruling is 
justified by values of stability, reliance, efficiency, dignity, and equality. These 
values, when properly understood, actually support rather than undermine the 
retrospectivity of judge-made law. Prospective overruling is an injudicious 
instrument. 
Introduction 
The spectre of retrospective law-making arises whenever a judgment overrules 
previous precedent, declares novel legal rules, or quashes governmental acts.1 The 
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, The University of British Columbia. For their generous
feedback, I thank Liora Lazarus, Dan Priel, Lewis Sargentich, Robert Sharpe, Lionel Smith, Oren Tamir, Andy 
Yu, the anonymous reviewers, colleagues at an Allard Law Faculty Colloquium, and attendees of online 
workshops hosted by the Project on the Foundations of Private Law at Harvard Law School and the Canadian 
Workshop in Private Law Theory.
1 J. Harris, “Retrospective Overruling and the Declaratory Theory in the United Kingdom: Three Recent 
Decisions” (2002) 26 Revue de droit de l’ULB 153, 154 (“Three Recent Decisions”). The terms “retrospective” 
and “retroactive” are interchangeable in the juridical context. This article uses “retrospective” when discussing 
the juridical context and “retroactive” for the legislative context. See C.J.G. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the 
Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.21-23; A. Burrows, “Common Law Retrospectivity” 
in A. Burrows, D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
p.547; cf J. Waldron, “Retroactive Law: How Dodgy was Duynhoven?” (2001) 10 Otago L. Rev. 631, 632-638 
(considering the legislative context).
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consequences of applying new judge-made law to pending and past disputes can be 
stark. Such judicial law-making has been said to destabilise settled transactions, 
upset parties’ ability to rely on prevailing law, treat people unequally, impose 
unanticipatable costs upon citizens and government, and drag the judicial institution 
into disrepute. These perceived problems find a solution in the technique of 
“prospective overruling”. This supposedly “well-established US practice” provides 
that an overruling court “may announce in advance that it will change the relevant 
rule or interpretation of the rule but only for future cases”.2 A court can implement 
beneficial changes in the law for the future without disturbing the past. This 
technique has accrued both judicial3 as well as governmental support. The Autumn 
2021 legislative agenda in England and Wales included enacting an unprecedented 
presumption of non-retrospective effect when a decision or statutory instrument 
under judicial review is quashed.4 It is said to be in the interests of legal certainty and 
the rule of law that an impugned act is deemed valid for the period prior to the date 
judgment is handed down.5  
Given its American origins it is apt to ask how non-retrospective judicial law-
making has fared in that country. The answer is: not well. In an article in the Yale 
Law Journal, I identify five distinct doctrinal frameworks that supposedly underpin 
this adjudicative technique, each of which have been deprecated and abandoned by 
the United States Supreme Court over the years.6 I offer in their place an alternative 
framework: embracing retrospective adjudication as tempered by orthodox limits on 
2 E. Steiner, “Judicial Rulings with Prospective Effect: From Comparison to Systematisation” in E. Steiner 
(ed), Comparing the Prospective Effect of Judicial Rulings Across Jurisdictions (Cham: Springer, 2015), p.2; see 
M. Arden, “Prospective Overruling” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 7.
3 See S. Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (2020) 130 Yale L.J. 276, 304-306 (citing judicial recognition
of the technique around the common law world); cf S. Beswick, “The Overpaid Tax Litigation: Roadblocked” 
(2021) 84 M.L.R. 1105, 1119-1120 (“Roadblocked”) (considering how a recent judgment undermines the 
doctrine).  
4 Judicial Review and Courts Bill 152-1, 2021-22 (E&W), cl.1(1)(29A)(9) (introduced on 21 July 2021). 
5 Ministry of Justice, The Government Response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law (CP 408, 
2021), pp.11, 28-31 (IRAL Response); Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review Reform Consultation: The 
Government Response (CP 477, 2021) pp.20-24.  
6 Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (fn.3 above), pp.293-298. 
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rights of action such as time-bars and procedural rules. 
Commonwealth jurists have tended to ground support for judicial non-
retrospectivity not in doctrinal frameworks as such, but rather on policy claims. 
Prospective-only legal change is said to advance the values of stability, reliance, 
efficiency, dignity, and equality. This article responds to these policy claims. Part I 
sets the stage by outlining the conventional conception of adjudication whereby 
retrospectivity is a characteristic of the dual judicial role of deciding cases and 
determining the law. This is the conception that proponents of the prospective 
overruling technique resist. Part II describes prospective overruling and how it 
purports to disentangle the judges’ adjudicatory and law-making roles. Part III 
critiques the policy claims that supposedly justify the technique. The discussion 
focuses on judicial overruling (since it is here that arguments for non-retrospectivity 
are thought to be strongest), but the insights should help to shed light on arguments 
over non-retrospective judicial developments of the law as well as the quashing of 
governmental acts.7 The analysis concludes that, contrary to proponents’ claims, in 
the adjudication of civil proceedings8 prospective overruling exacerbates instability 
in the law, undermines the reliance and expectation interests of successful parties to 
litigation, draws arbitrary and unequal distinctions among people subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts, is inefficient and unnecessary, and facilitates judicial 
activism. There are no compelling policy grounds underlying the prospective 
overruling technique. It should, accordingly, be rejected.  
7 Proponents of prospective overruling do not draw sharp distinctions between these three (often 
overlapping) categories of judicial law-making: see e.g. Steiner (fn.2 above), p.6.  
8 This article addresses only the civil context. In the criminal context there are additional values in the 
balance: the liberty of imprisoned persons on the one hand, and public safety and the administrability of the 
criminal justice system on the other. See J. Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1985), pp.189-190; K.H. Lau, “On Mandatory Criminal Sentences, Legislative 
Interpretation, and the Prospective Application of the Law: A View from Singapore” (2020) 41 Statute L.R. 96, 
101-103.  
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I. The Judge’s Dual Role
Judges have a dual role: they decide cases and they determine the law.9 Deciding 
cases—reaching the just resolution of disputes according to law—is the first call of 
the judge. Elucidating the law is the second.10 This ordering follows from the nature 
of the judicial method. Unlike legislators (which have discretion to enact laws 
generally) or even administrators (which may be delegated power to make law within 
a prescribed remit), courts have no independent law-making power. The law-making 
power of courts is (predominantly)11 dependent on the adjudication of disputes. 
Common law courts are not (foremost) advisory bodies. It is through deciding cases 
that judges develop the law.12  
The dual role of judicial decision-making is conventionally understood to be 
intertwined. Judges resolve disputes brought before them by parties. They do so by 
assessing with hindsight the conditions that prevailed at the time of the parties’ 
dispute. The resolution of disputes gives rise to rationes decidendi, which provide 
precedent for resolving other (materially similar) cases. This precedent is properly 
called judge-made law. It is a guide for future conduct and decisions. Gidon Gottlieb 
encapsulates how the judicial method entails both adjudication and law-making:  
9 P. Weiler, “Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making” (1970) 48 Can. B. Rev. 1, 30; G. Tedeschi, 
“Prospective Revision of Precedent” (1973) 8 Isr. L. Rev. 173, 178; A.G.L. Nicol, “Prospective Overruling: A 
New Device for English Courts?” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 542, 542; R.H.S. Tur, “Varieties of Overruling and Judicial 
Law-Making: Prospective Overruling in a Comparative Perspective” [1978] Jur. Rev. 33, 38 (“Varieties”); Stone, 
Precedent (fn.8 above), p.188.  
10 H.K. Lücke, “Judicial Impartiality and Judge Made Law” (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 29, 36, 40, 62; R. Cross and 
J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.232; J. Finnis, “Natural Law: 
The Classical Tradition” in J.L. Coleman, K.E. Himma and S.J. Shapiro, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.34-35; P. Jaffey, “Authority in the Common 
Law” (2011) 36 Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 1, 7; R. Sharpe, Good Judgment: Making Judicial Decisions (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2019) pp.78-80.  
11 Some jurisdictions recognise a procedure by which the executive may send a constitutional reference to 
be answered by the apex court. See e.g. Supreme Court Act (CA), s.5; Constitution of India Act (IN), art.143; 
Constitution of South Africa (SA), ss.80 and 84. Although not an adjudicatory process, such judicial 
pronouncements are still dependent upon the instigation of another.  
12 P.J. Fitzgerald (ed), Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966), p.177; 
M. McHugh “The Law-making Function of the Judicial Process—Part II” (1988) 62 Aust. L.J. 116, 121; P. 
Wargan, “Legal Sentience and the Problem of the Instant” (2013) 2 U.C.L. J.L. Juris. 278, 299.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990
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The doctrine of precedent … transmutes law-applying into law-making. Every 
inference made and every rule enunciated must be authorized or required by 
preexisting rules and principles, but precedent transforms that which is 
authorized or required into that which authorizes and requires. There is, 
therefore, no contradiction between the two propositions that courts always 
apply preexisting law and that courts create new law.13  
The continuity between application and creation in judicial decision-making 
distinguishes judicial law-making from legislating. With case law there is no clean 
separation between the “old” and the “new”. Even a novel judgment is never wholly 
“new” because, in order to resolve a novel dispute, the judge must ground his or her 
decision in rules, principles, and reasons that can fairly be said to have already had a 
footing in the law at the time the dispute before the court arose. In this way 
retrospectivity can be seen as a characteristic of judge-made law.14  
Under this conventional view, the adjudicatory context operates as both a source 
of and a substantive constraint on judicial law-making.15 It is constraining because, 
as the 1966 Practice Statement reminds, when judges are presented with an 
opportunity for law-making they must “bear in mind the danger of disturbing 
retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal 
arrangements have been entered into”.16 That danger is mitigated by the juridical 
practice of connecting judgments to the past. This practice accounts for the 
characterisation of the common law as developing “incrementally” or “modest[ly]”, 
even when in instant cases change may simultaneously seem to be “radical”.17  
13 G. Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1968), p.88.  
14 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.274-276. 
Though Ronald Dworkin famously eschewed describing the judicial role in terms of (substantive) retrospective 
law-making, Peter Jaffey has compellingly argued that Dworkin’s account of adjudication is reconcilable with 
the idea of justified judicial retrospectivity: P. Jaffey, “Two Ways to Understand the Common Law” (2017) 8 
Juris. 435, 454-457.  
15 W. Lucy, Understanding and Explaining Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.2-3, 
138; Sharpe (fn.10 above), pp.92-97; P. Hodge, “The Scope of Judicial Law-Making in the Common Law 
Tradition” (2020) 84 Rabels Zeitschrift 211, 222-227.  
16 Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (HL). 
17 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (HL) 378 per Lord Goff; Re Spectrum 
Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 A.C. 680 [34] per Lord Nichols; Samsoondar v Capital Insurance 
Company Ltd [2020] UKPC 33, [13] per Lord Burrows.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990
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That the context of retrospective adjudication constrains how judges decide cases 
can be seen in case law. Consider, for example, the landmark cases of Spectrum Plus 
and Final Note.18 Spectrum Plus concerned the correct interpretation of a bank’s 
standard form debenture charge over a company’s book debts. A seemingly clear rule 
was established by the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales in Siebe 
Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd,19 which interpreted such debentures as 
securing a fixed charge over book debts. Prima facie this precedent determined the 
status of such debentures in English law. The precedent subsequently came into 
conflict with a decision of the Privy Council, which interpreted a similar debenture 
in a case from New Zealand as securing only a floating charge.20 This conflict in 
precedent cast a shadow over the legal status of debenture charges in English law. It 
destabilised the fixed/floating charge distinction. As a result, upon the company 
Spectrum Plus Ltd falling into liquidation, conflict arose between the bank and the 
company’s preferential creditors regarding who had priority over the company’s 
book debts. The claimants in Spectrum Plus sought to overturn Siebe Gorman to 
bring the rule in England into line with the Privy Council’s decision. The House of 
Lords assessed the conflicting principles and reasoned that the claimants had the 
better argument. The seemingly clear rule in Siebe Gorman could not be justified. 
The House overruled the prior precedent. Their decision vindicated the 
understanding of the law held by preferential creditors over the understanding held 
by banks. How one perceives the House’s intervention may turn on one’s 
jurisprudential perspective on adjudication. Some understand the judgment to have 
changed the law retrospectively in order to settle pre-existing uncertainty regarding 
the authoritative force of Siebe Gorman.21 Others understand the judgment to have 
18 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above); Friedmann Equity Developments Inc v Final Note Ltd [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842 
(SCC) (“Final Note”).  
19 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 142 (Ch).  
20 Agnew v Comr of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 A.C. 710 (PC).  
21 See J. Lewis, “Retrospective Effect: Is Article 5 any Different?” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 370, 373-374. 
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corrected a pre-existing error expressed in Siebe Gorman.22 Both perspectives can 
explain and justify the House’s novel judgment applying (retrospectively) to the 
parties before it.  
Contrast Final Note, which concerned the continued legitimacy of the sealed 
contract rule in Canadian common law. Like in Spectrum Plus, the Supreme Court 
of Canada was invited to overturn seemingly settled precedent.23 The claimants 
criticised the sealed contract rule as anachronistic and out of step with societal 
practice. Unlike Spectrum Plus, however, there was “no conflicting appellate 
authority as to the application of the sealed contract rule in Canada”.24 Nor was the 
rule found to be “out of step with the developments in the common law in other 
jurisdictions”, or inconsistent with commercial reality.25 Reflecting both on the rule’s 
place in the wider case law and the fabric of society, the Court regarded itself as 
constrained to uphold the sealed contract rule as valid law.26 In these circumstances, 
abolishing the rule would have been unjustified retrospective law-making.27  
Spectrum Plus illustrates how courts must sometimes make law to resolve 
disagreement as to what the law actually requires. Final Note illustrates how courts 
do not have a free hand to legislate change. In both cases the scope and manner of 
law-making was constrained by the adjudicatory context. To the extent the House of 
Lords in Spectrum Plus engaged in retrospective law-making, it was presented in 
their Lordships’ opinions as a justified intervention.  
22 See D. Sheehan and T.T. Arvind, “Prospective Overruling and the Fixed-Floating Charge Debate” (2006) 
122 L.Q.R. 20, 20-23.  
23 As established in Porter v Pelton (1903) 33 S.C.R. 449 (SCC). 
24 Final Note (fn.18 above), [44].  
25 Final Note (fn.18 above), [44].  
26 Final Note (fn.18 above), [51]; cf Teva Canada Ltd v TD Canada Trust, 2017 SCC 51, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 
317, [83]. 
27 cf G.R. Hall, “Preserving the Clavicle in the Cat: Stunted Reform of Common Law Rules in the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 89, 90-91 (contending that the Court should have abolished the rule 
with prospective-only effect); but see A.J. Duggan and K. Roach, “A Further Note on Final Note: The Scope and 
Limits of Judicial Law Making” (2002) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 115, 135-138 (expressing pessimism about Hall’s 
contention).  
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II. The Dual Role Disentangled
The dual role of judicial decision-making is intertwined on the conventional 
account: adjudication leads to constrained judicial law-making, and disputes over 
judge-made laws lead to adjudication. A competing account, which has its roots in 
American Legal Realism, seeks to disentangle this dual role. It proposes that we can 
“accept the obvious enough distinction between the judge as policymaker and the 
judge as adjudicator”.28 Utilising this distinction, some legal realists29 claim that the 
two functions of law-making and adjudication can be separated by affording them 
different temporal ambits.30 Not only that, the courts’ functions should be separated 
in some cases. According to this account, some judicial changes in the law should 
operate for the future but not for the past. Courts have the power to change the law 
prospectively for future cases, while continuing to decide past disputes under the 
“old” legal rule that was thought to apply at the time those disputes arose. This is the 
technique of “prospective overruling”.31 This Part describes this technique as well as 
some of the reasons jurists are divided over its form. Part III critiques it.  
A. What is Prospective Overruling?
The term “prospective overruling” is a misnomer.32 First, there is nothing
28 B.H. Levy, “Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling” (1960) 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 28. 
29 This is not to suggest that anyone who identifies as a legal realist must hold this view. My contention is 
only that arguments that the dual role can be disentangled, and that courts can overrule with prospective-only 
effect, are legal realist arguments. See P.J. Mishkin and C. Morris, On Law in Courts (Brooklyn: Foundation 
Press, 1965), pp.302-303 (noting that one of the fathers of American Legal Realism, Karl Llewellyn, did not go 
so far as to endorse the “polarizing” technique of prospective overruling). 
30 A.R. Blackshield, “‘Fundamental Rights’ and the Economic Viability of the Indian Nation: Part Three: 
Prospective Overruling” (1968) 10 J. Indian L. Inst. 183, 215-228; Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), pp.39-41; Stone, 
Precedent (fn.8 above), p.188; Harris, “Three Recent Decisions” (fn.1 above), pp.177-181; Steiner (fn.2 above), 
pp.14-16.  
31 It is sometimes characterised as related to the precarious public law voidability doctrine. Voidable acts 
are “flawed but valid and effective except to the extent that a competent tribunal annuls them”. D. Feldman, 
“Error of Law and Flawed Administrative Acts” (2014) 73 C.L.J. 275, 312; cf P.A. Joseph, “False Dichotomies 
in Administrative Law: From There to Here” (2016) N.Z. L. Rev. 127, 137-140. The prospective overruling 
doctrine treats impugned acts as void for some (otherwise timely) cases and valid for others, based simply upon 
the date judgment is handed down.  
32 Blackshield (fn.30 above), p.201; Department of Corrections v Gardiner [2017] NZCA 608, [2018] 2 
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distinctive about the prospectivity of overruling: new judgments always 
presumptively serve as precedent for future cases. What is distinctive about this 
juridical technique is that it limits the retrospective effect of judge-made law. 
Secondly, the term does not only capture overruling: it is employed in relation to 
cases of “new” judge-made law generally, such as when a court declares a novel legal 
rule in the absence of prior precedent or quashes a statutory or regulatory provision. 
A more accurate label is “non-retroactive judicial law-making”.33 This article 
nevertheless uses the prevailing nomenclature.  
Among scholars and judges who favour prospective overruling as a juridical 
device, there is division as to what form it should take.  
Pure Prospective Overruling 
A seemingly simple way to avoid retrospectivity of novel precedent is for a court 
to announce a new rule that is to be applied only to future events.34 This attempts a 
clean split between the court’s adjudicatory and law-making functions. Adjudication 
of the dispute is resolved according to the “old” rule, because the dispute necessarily 
arose before the court delivered its judgment changing the rule. The novel precedent 
governs only those disputes arising after the date it is handed down. This is the 
“critical date” that separates the “old” law from the “new”.35 For example, when the 
House of Lords abandoned the doctrine of advocates’ immunity in Arthur JS Hall & 
Son v Simons—a doctrine that for centuries had shielded barristers from the law of 
negligence—Lord Hope opined that the change in the law should affect only future 
cases.36 In his minority view, it would not have been just to hold the parties in Simons 
N.Z.L.R. 712, [16] per Miller J. 
33 B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p.199 
(“Retroactivity”); see Steiner (fn.2 above), pp.6-8.  
34 This approach is favoured by Nicol (fn.9 above), p.547, and J. Wall, “Prospective Overruling—It’s about 
Time” (2009) 12 Otago L. Rev. 131, 147, and defended by Blackshield (fn.30 above), pp.196-199.  
35 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.543.  
36 [2002] 1 A.C. 615, 726 (“Simons”). 
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to the new rule of no-immunity given that the claimants’ grievances arose at a time 
when advocates’ immunity was still recognised in English law.37  
This “pure” form of prospective overruling can be a double-edged sword for 
claimants who seek a rule-change but will not benefit from it in their case. Claimants 
can become saddled with the costs of litigating forward-looking considerations that 
may be held to have no relevance to their dispute (the new rule essentially being 
obiter dicta from their perspective).38 Prospective overruling also seems to deny 
successful claimants the fruits of their victory, which raises questions of fairness and 
incentives. It would seem to be unfair that the successful party does not benefit from 
the rule-change they have brought about, while the losing party gets the benefit of an 
old rule that the court has impugned.39 And the technique seems to gut parties’ 
incentives to seek positive changes in the law: why pursue costly litigation when 
success will not result in reward?40 Some answers have been posed. Institutional or 
repeat players have an incentive to pursue favourable rules for future transactions.41 
If prospective overruling is an exceptional recourse then parties cannot assume ex 
ante that they will be denied the benefit of the rule change, so their incentives to seek 
change should remain largely intact.42 Perhaps a state fund could be set up to 
reimburse successful claimants’ legal costs in lieu of the fruits of litigation.43 These 
responses only partially, and in the latter instance hypothetically, address the 
concerns, however.  
37 See Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [73] per Lord Hope.  
38 Nicol (fn.9 above), pp.543, 550.  
39 S. Freedman, “Continuity and Change—A Task of Reconciliation” (1973) 8 U.B.C. L. Rev. 209, 214. 
40 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, rev ed, 1969), p.57; R. Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.155-157.  
41 Nicol (fn.9 above), pp.548-550. 
42 W. Zhuang, “Prospective Judicial Pronouncements and Limits to Judicial Law-Making” (2016) 28 
S.Ac.L.J. 611, 618. Although this is not so for parties who perceive their case to be exceptional and anticipate it
being treated as such by a court, or where legislation creates a presumption of non-retrospective effect of certain
judgments (e.g. Judicial Review and Courts Bill 152-1, 2020-21 (E&W), cl.1(1)(29A)(9)).
43 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.547; see IRAL Response (fn.5 above), p.28. 
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Selective Prospective Overruling 
These objections to pure prospective overruling have led some jurists to favour 
diluting the technique.44 In order to avoid the fairness and incentive problems 
perceived by claimants, a court might selectively apply the “new” rule to the 
immediate parties’ dispute while holding that other similarly placed parties remain 
subject to the “old” rule. For example, when the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
abandoned the doctrine of advocates’ immunity in Chamberlains v Lai, Tipping J 
endorsed “[a]n intermediate position between a fully prospective and a fully 
retrospective approach”.45 Justice Tipping’s minority view favoured exempting the 
immediate parties to the law-changing case from non-retrospectivity, so that 
claimants who advance ground-breaking litigation receive the fruits of victory.  
This approach implies a problematic concession that the law really ought to have 
been recognised as the claimants asserted it (hence the carve-out in their favour), and 
that other similarly placed parties are being prevented from relying on the “correct” 
legal position for mere administrability reasons. The selective approach also trades 
the fairness and incentive problems for equality and arbitrariness problems. It applies 
different rules to similarly placed parties. The successful claimants to the law-
changing case are treated more favourably (and the losing respondents less 
favourably) compared to other parties with equivalent grievances.46 This unequal 
treatment depends solely on whose dispute happens to reach an appellate court first—
regardless of whether it is the most deserving case for special treatment.  
To mitigate these equality and arbitrariness problems, a court could expand the 
scope of retrospectivity by applying the new rule to all materially similar claims 
pending before the courts. This was the approach the Supreme Court of Ireland took 
44 See e.g. A.P. Lester, “English Judges as Law Makers” (1993) Public L. 269, 287; P.A. Joseph, 
“Constitutional Law: Prospective Overruling” (2006) N.Z. L. Rev. 138, 142.  
45 [2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 N.Z.L.R. 7, [134] (“Chamberlains”); see similarly Re Remuneration of Judges 
of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3 (SCC) [20].  
46 Nicol (fn.9 above), pp.543, 547; Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [27] per Lord Nicholls. 
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in Murphy v Attorney-General.47 The Court held certain taxation provisions 
unconstitutional, but restricted rights to restitution to those taxpayers who had 
already filed tax recovery claims at the time of its decision. Under this approach, 
inequality as between litigants is avoided, but it remains as between litigants and 
would-be litigants. It incentivises precautionary claims. To the extent that claimants 
will bring themselves “within the judicial system” as a precautionary measure 
pending the outcome of a lead case, the efficacy of the entire technique becomes 
questionable.48 The more parties that are exempted from non-retrospectivity, the 
more the rule begins to resemble conventional retrospectivity.49  
B. What isn’t Prospective Overruling?
Several adjudicative techniques are erroneously painted as “prospective
overruling in disguise”.50 Distinguishing or not-following a precedent is not 
equivalent to prospective overruling.51 The effects may look similar, in that the 
court’s decision will not impact those cases or circumstances falling under the 
distinguished or not-followed precedent. But the decision to distinguish or not to 
follow bears the normal temporal ambit. Its backward-looking effects are not curbed. 
It is a determination of the law that can apply to accrued disputes. Unlike prospective 
overruling, distinguishing or not-following a precedent comports with the dual role 
of judicial decision-making.  
Obiter dicta within a judgment that questions the soundness of a rule is not 
equivalent to prospective law-making, either. It is, though, an important juridical 
signal. It signals that reliance on the rule may be imprudent and thereby lays the 
47 [1982] I.R. 241, discussed in Arden (fn.2 above).  
48 Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), p.142. 
49 B. Juratowitch, “The Temporal Effect of Judgments in the United Kingdom” in P. Popelier and others 
(eds), The Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), p.175 (“Temporal Effect”).  
50 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.551.  
51 R.H.S. Tur, “Time and Law” (2002) 22 O.J.L.S. 463, 477. 
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ground for incremental change.52 The advocates’ immunity jurisprudence illustrates 
this approach well. Though the immunity was longstanding, its rationale was 
questioned and revised many times over before it was ultimately abandoned. The 
House of Lords in Rondel v Worsley affirmed the immunity on the basis of public 
policy considerations,53 which were queried in Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co54 and 
narrowed in Ridehalgh v Horsefield.55 Bolstered by academic critique, when the 
issue returned to the respective apex courts of the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
it had become sufficiently dubious such that all of the judges, Lord Hope aside, were 
content to abolish the immunity with retrospective effect.56  
Announcing a new rule in a case that does not meet the conditions of the rule is 
not judicially legislating with prospective-only effect. It would mischaracterise 
Hedley Byrne v Heller to say that the judgment operated in substance as prospective 
overruling given the novel precedent was not applied on the facts of the case.57 
Hedley Byrne was still dispositive of cases within its scope.58  
Finally, prospective overruling is distinct from the suspended declaration 
doctrine.  A court does not prospectively overrule when it announces a new rule but 
suspends its implementation, allowing the legislature time to respond.59 In such 
cases, the judgment states the law as it ought to have been understood at the time of 
dispute, while suspending the remedial implications for a time. If the legislature takes 
52 J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp.198, 214; M. Coper, “Concern 
about Judicial Method” (2006) 30 Melb. U.L. Rev. 554, 567-568 (“Concern”).  
53 [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (“Rondel”). 
54 [1980] A.C. 198 (HL); see Dworkin (fn.40 above), pp.220, 401. 
55 [1994] Ch. 205 (CA).  
56 See Chamberlains (fn.45 above), [95] per Elias CJ, [154] per Tipping J, [205] per Thomas J; Awoyomi v 
Radford [2007] EWHC 1671, [2008] Q.B. 793, [19] per Lloyd Jones J.  
57 cf W. Friedmann, “Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling” (1966) 29 M.L.R. 593, 
605; A. Rodger, “A Time for Everything under the Law: Some Reflections on Retrospectivity” (2005) 121 L.Q.R. 
57, 78.  
58 M.D.A. Freeman, “Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling” [1973] 
C.L.P. 166, 202 (“Standards”); M.L. Friedland, “Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking” (1974) 24
U. Toronto L.J. 170, 181-182.
59 cf Hall (fn.27 above), p.109; Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [11] and [22] per Lord Nicholls.
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no action before the suspension expires, the judgment will apply to justiciable 
disputes in the usual way: i.e. retrospectively.60 If the legislature acts to reverse or 
resolve the juridical rule, it will only fully override the court’s precedent when the 
statute itself is enacted with retroactive effect.61  
C. Is it an Exceptional Doctrine?
Most jurists characterise prospective overruling as an exceptional doctrine. Philip
Joseph, by contrast, suggests that it should be the norm of judicial law-making. 
Joseph maintains that there is no qualitative difference between legal change brought 
about by statute and change brought about by adjudication: new law is made either 
way. He takes the Austinian view that judicial law-making is essentially delegated 
legislating. Retroactive legislation presumptively violates the rule of law. For judges 
as much as parliamentarians, then, “[a]s a general prescription, legal change should 
be prospective”.62 The weight of judicial63 and scholarly64 opinion, however, is that 
prospective overruling—if it applies at all—is, and should be, an exception to the 
normal course of retrospective adjudication. The rationale is grounded in stare 
decisis. It is a basic presumption of the common law method that judgments of higher 
60 Duggan and Roach (fn.27 above), p.130; Juratowitch, “Temporal Effect” (fn.49 above), pp.170, 177; L. 
Smith, “Canada: The Rise of Judgments with Suspended Effect” in E. Steiner (ed), Comparing the Prospective 
Effect of Judicial Rulings Across Jurisdictions (Cham: Springer, 2015), p.254; see Judicial Review and Courts 
Bill 152-1, 2020-21 (E&W), cl.1(1)(29A)(6).  
61 S. Choudhry and K.W. Roach, “Putting the Past behind Us? Prospective Judicial and Legislative 
Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205, 233; A. Mason, “The Common Law” in S.N.M. Young 
and Y. Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal: The Development of the Law in China’s Hong Kong 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.343.  
62 Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), p.148; see similarly IRAL Response (fn.5 above), p.31. 
This idea has roots in Jeremy Bentham’s furious critique of judicial law-making: Lücke (fn.10 above), p.44; cf 
Weiler (fn.9 above), p.30.  
63 See Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [41] per Lord Nicholls, [74] per Lord Hope; Canada (Attorney General) 
v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, [99] per LeBel and Rothstein JJ, [140] per Bastarache J (“Hislop”); 
Ramdeen v The State (Trinidad and Tobago) [2014] UKPC 7, [2014] 3 W.L.R. 1523, [90] per Lord Mance; B.A. 
Linga Reddy v Karnataka State Transport Authority [2014] INSC 920, [37] per Arun Mishra J; FII Test 
Claimants v HMRC (No.2) [2020] UKSC 47, [2020] S.T.C. 2387 [99] per Lord Reed and Lord Hodge, [293] per 
Lord Briggs and Lord Sales (“FII Test Claimants No.2”).  
64 See Blackshield (fn.30 above), pp.190-191; Friedland (fn.58 above), p.171; Friedmann (fn.57 above), 
p.605; Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), pp.191-192; Choudhry and Roach (fn.61 above), p.214.
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courts operate as precedent for all other cases unless and until they are overruled. A 
general rule of prospectivity of judge-made law would be infeasible. Parties would 
forever disagree about the novelty and temporal ambit of competing precedents. 
Instead of bringing clarity to the law, each new appellate judgment would compound 
uncertainty as to which precedent governs comparable cases. Scholars who favour 
prospective overruling therefore typically reserve the technique for those cases where 
the change in law is surprising or unexpected, where compelling reliance interests 
are at stake, and where the balance of justice favours non-retrospectivity.65 These 
values warrant robust consideration.  
III. Temporal Justice
Six primary instrumental justifications have been advanced in favour of the 
technique of prospective overruling. They are the social interest in (a) a stable legal 
order; (b) protection of reliance and expectation interests; (c) the efficiency of 
judicial institutions; (d) the dignity and good repute of judicial institutions; (e) the 
efficiency of administrative or legislative action; and (f) the equality of treatment for 
like cases.66 This Part argues that these six values, when properly understood, 
actually support (rather than undermine) the retrospectivity of judge-made law. 
Prospective overruling does not achieve its intended aims.  
A. Stable Legal Order
The rule of law requires that laws should generally be stable. They should not be 
changed frequently. A stable legal order enables people to identify their rights and 
65 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.552. 
66 These values are summarised in J. Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1966), p.661 and Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.189. Stone’s list builds upon T.S. Currier, 
“Time and Change: Prospective Overruling in Judge-Made Law” (1965) 51 Va. L. Rev. 201, 234; see Friedmann 
(fn.57 above), p.604. Stone did not think that all six values would necessarily weigh in favour of prospective 
overruling. He thought they would have to be balanced against each other. Nevertheless, scholarly arguments 
have been made for each value in support of prospective overruling. See also Judicial Review and Courts Bill 
152-1, 2020-21 (E&W), cl.1(1)(29A)(8).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990
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duties under law, to act in compliance with the law, and to plan and interact with 
certainty.67 Stability is the premise of stare decisis. At its height the doctrine of 
precedent implies that the law being settled is more important than that it being 
settled right.68 Following precedent ensures consistency and predictability of 
adjudication. Disputes can be avoided when their judicial resolution is readily 
anticipatable. But stare decisis cannot alone deliver a stable legal order. There must 
also be mechanisms for juridical innovation. For doctrine to serve society it must 
keep pace with societal developments. This will sometimes require judges to depart 
from old rules. As Michael Freeman notes:  
Whilst restraint in exercising the judicial power to overrule precedents makes 
for stability, abstention can defeat this very stability, for a practice of rigid 
adherence to precedent will eventually produce an accumulation of outmoded 
rules which are likely to be blurred by artificial distinctions.69 
The orthodox way in which the anchor of stare decisis yields to the winds of 
innovation is incremental development of the law by judges.70 The common law is 
revised and refined like the planks of the Ship of Theseus. Gradual development of 
the law maintains the substance of established rights while signalling changes to 
which people should adjust their expectations. Conservative change preserves 
stability. 
Radical legal change, by contrast, is destabilising. When courts overrule settled 
precedent or determine rules of law that controvert established social practice they 
expose disjunction between the law then and now. Particularly stark illustrations arise 
when a court announces a binary change in a rule. For example, revising the 
67 Fuller (fn.40 above), p.39; Raz (fn.52 above), pp.214-215; S. Lewis, “Precedent and the Rule of Law” 
(2021) 41 O.J.L.S. _, *9-*12.  
68 London Street Tramways Co Ltd v London County Council [1898] A.C. 375 (HL) 380 per Lord Halsbury; 
Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 U.S. 393 (1932) 406 per Brandeis J. 
69 M.D.A. Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 8th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 
pp.1536-1537 (“Jurisprudence”).  
70 Freeman, “Standards” (fn.58 above), p.179; Coper (fn.52 above), pp.560-564. 
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interpretation of a debenture from a fixed charge over debts to a floating charge,71 
interpreting completed government contracts to be ultra vires,72 or abolishing the 
common law bar on recovery for mistakes of law,73 the immunity of advocates,74 or 
the sealed contract rule.75 Retrospective application of a binary rule-change can be 
destabilising when it undermines the basis on which people planned, acted, and 
interacted. Such changes seem to contravene the rationale underpinning stare decisis. 
It is said that this dilemma can be mitigated by non-retrospectivity. In instances of 
radical legal change, prospective overruling actually “defers to the stare decisis 
principle by insisting that the old decision now overruled should continue to stand 
up to the time at which it was overruled”.76 The new rule then takes over from that 
point. Non-retrospectivity thus eases the transition to the new rule.  
Proponents of the prospective overruling technique tout transitional stability as a 
key virtue.77 “So far from endangering legal certainty”, Anthony Lester contends, 
“prospective overruling respects legal certainty”.78 The Supreme Court of India 
embraced this rationale when it became the first apex court in the Commonwealth to 
endorse the technique. Chief Justice Subba Rao considered that prospective-only 
judicial law-making “enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by 
correcting its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on the past 
transactions”.79 It avoids the injustice of interfering with arrangements ex post facto 
and facilitates “a less traumatic change”.80 Some go further and suggest that non-
71 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above).  
72 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 A.C. 1 (HL).  
73 Kleinwort Benson (fn.17 above); see Harris, “Three Recent Decisions” (fn.1 above), pp.157-166. 
74 Simons (fn.36 above); Chamberlains (fn.45 above); see Harris, “Three Recent Decisions” (fn.1 above), 
pp.171-177.  
75 As advocated (unsuccessfully) by the claimants in Final Note (fn.18 above). 
76 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.188. 
77 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.553; K. Mason, “Prospective Overruling” (1989) 63 Aust. L.J. 526, 530; Choudhry 
and Roach (fn.61 above), p.218; see IRAL Response (fn.5 above), p.28.  
78 Lester (fn.44 above), p.286. 
79 Golak Nath v State of Punjab [1967] 2 S.C.R. (India) 762, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643, 1668 (emphasis added); 
see Blackshield (fn.30 above), pp.229-230, 238.  
80 Freeman, “Standards” (fn.58 above), p.201; see Lord Mackay, “Can Judges Change the Law?” (1988) 73 
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retrospectivity of judge-made law is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law. 
Philip Joseph and Jesse Wall both claim that retrospective overruling offends the first 
principle of the rule of law identified by Joseph Raz.81 Namely, that: “All laws should 
be prospective, open, and clear.”82 No one can be guided today by what judges might 
say in the future. So, Joseph and Wall contend, when judges say something new they 
should not impose their novel rulings on past events. Judicial law-making is, on their 
account, essentially a legislative endeavour.83 Accordingly, when judges make law 
they should be bound by the same constraints as legislatures: their changes in the law 
should apply only to the future.  
This reasoning employs a simplistic view of legal stability and the judge’s role. 
Non-retrospectivity proponents paint a binary picture: that a legal rule was X until a 
judgment changes the rule to ¬X. Prospective overruling operates simply to transition 
the rule from one stable equilibrium to another. This picture understates the 
conditions of instability that invariably precipitate any law-change. Parties litigate 
disputes because they cannot agree on what law applies to their case. A seemingly 
clear rule may be shown to conflict with some other relevant rule or standard, or to 
have been impugned in prior case law or scholarship. Even before it reaches the 
courtroom such a rule may come to be considered of questionable authority. 
Overruling may be justified when a rule can no longer be counted on as providing an 
answer, but has instead itself become a question. It is for this reason that Lord Devlin 
thought that concerns over the retrospectivity of judicial overruling were 
exaggerated: 
A judge-made change in the law rarely comes out of a blue sky. Rumblings 
from Olympus in the form of obiter dicta will give warning of unsettled 
Proc. Brit. Acad. 285, 305. 
81 Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), p.138; Wall (fn.34 above), pp.131-132, 140; see IRAL 
Response (fn.5 above), p.31; cf Sampford (fn.1 above), p.225; S. Beswick, “Prospective Overruling Offends the 
Rule of Law” [2021] N.Z.L.J. 274, 274-276.  
82 Raz (fn.52 above), p.214. 
83 Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), pp.140, 148; Wall (fn.34 above), p.143; cf Weiler 
(fn.9 above), p.30.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990
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weather. Unsettled weather is itself of course bound to cause uncertainty, but 
inevitably it precedes the solution of every difficult question of law.84 
Judicial change in the law occurs because a rule of law has become incapable of 
clearly guiding conduct.85 A novel precedent is both a response to legal instability, 
as well as a vehicle of legal change.  
As an illustration, consider a prominent series of cases awarding against 
government restitution of monies “mistakenly” paid under void contracts or taxation 
provisions. In 1998 in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC,86 the House of Lords 
reversed longstanding common law precedent that had barred restitutionary claims 
brought on the ground of mistake of law. A majority further held that such claims 
were subject to an extended limitation period that commenced once the mistake was 
discoverable. In 2006 in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v IRC,87 the House of 
Lords ruled for the first time that taxes could be recovered as restitution for mistake 
of law. A majority further held that for limitation purposes such claims were not 
“discoverable” until an appellate court authoritatively settled the point of law in 
dispute. In 2007 in Sempra Metals Ltd v IRC,88 the House of Lords departed from 
centuries of authority and ruled for the first time that interest at a compounding rate 
was recoverable as unjust enrichment in cases such as these. In 2018 in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v HMRC,89 the Supreme Court unanimously overturned Sempra 
Metals and ruled that unjust enrichment claimants were limited to statutory simple 
interest. And in 2020 in FII Test Claimants v HMRC (No.2),90 the Supreme Court 
unanimously overturned the limitation rule foreshadowed in Kleinwort Benson and 
announced in Deutsche Morgan. In each of these cases the parties advanced 
84 Lord Devlin, “Judges and Lawmakers” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 1, 10.  
85 Raz (fn.52 above), pp.198, 214; S. Lewis (fn.67 above), pp.*13-14. 
86 Kleinwort Benson (fn.17 above).  
87 [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 A.C. 558 (“Deutsche Morgan”). 
88 [2007] UKHL 34, [2008] 1 A.C. 561.  
89 [2018] UKSC 39, [2018] S.T.C. 1657; see also FII Test Claimants v HMRC (No.3) [2021] UKSC 31, [8], 
[85]-[118].  
90 FII Test Claimants No.2 (fn.63 above). 
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competing theories of how the law governed their (novel) disputes. The judgments 
resolving their disputes were novel. They “changed” the law in response to the 
disputed (and unstable) legal doctrines being litigated. Yet, if each judgment had 
been applied only prospectively,91 the claimants to these cases would have been 
denied the relief they sought every time they succeeded on the merits. Or, if 
prospectivity were applied only to explicit instances of overruling (such as the 
judgments of FII Test Claimants No.2 and Prudential Assurance), the claimants 
would have been entitled to vast restitutionary sums relying on interpretations of law 
that the Supreme Court has explicitly overturned for being erroneous. These 
judgments reveal how judge-made law (here, the common law of restitution of 
overpaid tax) can be unstable and in development even when there is recent high-
level precedent on point. Such precedent is not in itself sufficient to make for a stable 
legal order.  
The claim that prospective overruling preserves stability is not only too 
simplistic; it flouts a key premise of its own underpinning legal theory. Prospective 
overruling is an unorthodox juridical technique—an exception to the norm of 
retrospective adjudication—which emerged from American legal realist 
jurisprudence. Rule scepticism is a hallmark of legal realism. Realism does not see 
law as inherently stable. Law is “in flux”.92 The sources of law (case law and statute) 
are not determinative of disputes between people. Doctrine can always be corralled 
to support either side in litigation. Accordingly, the realist view is that in every 
dispute judges have choice to say what the law is. This is not to say that judges act 
as unconstrained legislators. The social practice of law and the expectations of 
acceptable judicial decision-making give law “a significant measure of stability”.93 
91 Say, on the basis that “[t]ax had been collected and spent without challenge … and it would be inequitable 
if those taxes had to be repaid”: Arden (fn.2 above), p.7.  
92 K.N. Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 
1222, 1236; see Levy (fn.28 above), p.25.  
93 H. Dagan, “The Real Legacy of American Legal Realism” (2018) 38 O.J.L.S. 123, 134. 
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But it is a contingent stability. Law’s dynamism means “it can change even when the 
pedigreed sources themselves remain intact”.94 From this perspective, the realists 
who tout prospective overruling err in assuming that a statement of doctrine remains 
good law up until the point it is overruled. Realism tells us that all doctrine is to some 
degree unstable.  
In this light, Joseph and Wall’s reliance on Raz is curious. Raz does say that 
retroactive statutes prima facie contravene the rule of law. But he does not conflate 
retrospective overruling with retroactive legislating. Like Lord Devlin, Raz notes that 
courts invariably only entertain overruling when the stability of a legal rule has 
already been put in question by obiter dicta or off-the-Bench pronouncements. In 
such circumstances, Raz states, “[t]he law is still formally settled but people are put 
on notice not to rely on it. The “vice” of retroactivity is here avoided. Instead we 
have the disadvantages of uncertainty which apply to all unregulated disputes”.95 The 
“vice” of retroactivity is avoided because by the time it comes to be abandoned an 
impugned rule can already be seen to be unstable. In hard cases the law is unstable: 
there is a genuine question as to how parties’ disputes are to be resolved. 
Retrospectivity serves to stabilise the law by answering that question. In this way 
judicial retrospectivity can be seen (counterintuitively to some) to vindicate the rule 
of law.96  
Returning to Lord Devlin’s meteorological metaphor, “unsettled weather” 
precipitated the landmark cases in which the retrospectivity of overruling has been 
critiqued. The debenture interpretation in Spectrum Plus;97 the vires of local council 
94 Dagan (fn.93 above), p.128. 
95 Raz (fn.52 above), p.198 fn.18; see J. Raz, “Facing Up: A Reply” (1989) 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1153, 1209-
1212; see also Hart (fn.14 above), p.276.  
96 T.A.O. Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.192-193; T. Endicott, 
“Adjudication and the Law” (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 311, 317-320, 326; M. Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.119-122; Beswick, “Rule of Law” (fn.81 above) pp.274-
275.  
97 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above). 
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swaps contracts;98 the mistake-of-law bar;99 the immunity of advocates;100 the sealed 
contract rule101—each were decried in the law reports, the law reviews, and at the 
bar prior to the courts’ formal intervention. The judgments in these cases were 
responding to already-existing disagreements as to the applicable law—not simply 
to disagreements as to what the law should be for future cases. These landmark 
judgments were a response to legal instability and uncertainty. Prospective 
overruling could not, therefore, facilitate transitional stability. It is an illusion that 
the technique promotes stability by preserving existing rights and avoiding “sudden 
discontinuities from previously established rules and practices”.102 To the contrary, 
the technique amplifies discontinuity by preserving an impugned rule up until the 
date when a judgment brings clarity to the law. Prospective overruling offers stability 
for the future by obfuscating the instability of the past.  
B. Reliance and Expectation
The “core argument” for curbing judicial law-making is the protection of reliance
and expectation interests.103 People must act and interact in reliance on the law of the 
day. They tend to expect “that the laws that will be applied to their actions (and 
transactions) by courts will be the same as the laws that applied at the time they acted 
or transacted”.104 These values are particularly salient in the realm of commerce. 
Legal certainty is crucial to the smooth performance of contracts, property 
settlement, taxation, and payments.105  
98 Hazell (fn.72 above).  
99 Kleinwort Benson (fn.17 above).  
100 Simons (fn.36 above); Chamberlains (fn.45 above). 
101 Final Note (fn.18 above).  
102 cf Mackay (fn.80 above), p.305.  
103 A. Palmer and C. Sampford, “Judicial Retrospectivity in Australia” (1995) 4 Griffith L. Rev. 170, 171. 
104 Palmer and Sampford (fn.103 above), p.171; cf Lymington Marina Ltd v MacNamara [2007] EWCA Civ 
151, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 825, [33] per Arden LJ.  
105 Lord Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 4th edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1979), p.857; Stone, 
Precedent (fn.8 above), p.190; Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), p.44.  
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It is because people rely on rules and precedent that courts hesitate to change the 
law at all. Judicial law-making creates “the danger of disturbing retrospectively the 
basis” of past transactions.106 It is thought that courts require “special justification” 
before “upsetting legitimate expectations” through retrospective changes.107 If only 
they could effect beneficial changes in the law without disturbing reliance and 
expectation interests. That is the promise of prospective overruling. The purpose of 
curbing the retrospective effects of novel precedent is to ensure that actions taken on 
the basis of an “old” law stay governed by that old law, while future actions are 
governed by the “new” law. Reliance is a necessary condition for invoking the 
technique. For, as Julius Stone opines, “[u]nless there was reliance, how could there 
be injustice arising therefrom?”108  
The protection of reliance and expectation interests is a facially persuasive 
justification for limiting retrospectivity, which unravels under scrutiny.109 Tensions 
within these concepts are too readily overlooked. First, proponents of prospective 
overruling are at odds as to whether actual reliance or constructive reliance is needed. 
On the one hand, if the purpose is to protect parties’ reliance and expectation 
interests, then the parties ought to show they actually had such interests. An 
impugned rule should not linger for the benefit of parties who never placed any stock 
in it. Prospective overruling is necessary only to protect parties who had “actual 
justified reliance”.110 Such claims should be supported by evidence.111 This may well 
be possible in leading cases, such as Spectrum Plus or Final Note, where respondents 
oppose a binary rule-change because of their reliance on the old rule. But not 
everyone who stands to be affected by a rule-change will necessarily have relied on 
106 Practice Statement (fn.16 above).  
107 Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3, [2015] 1 A.C. 1016, 
[61] per Lord Mance; see Final Note (fn.18 above), [46].
108 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.192.
109 See further Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (fn.3 above), pp.312-324.
110 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.192; see Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), p.44; Juratowitch, Retroactivity
(fn.33 above), pp.44-47. 
111 Duggan and Roach (fn.27 above), pp.135, 138, citing Friedland (fn.58 above). 
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the old rule. To the contrary, it may be “pure romanticism to pretend” that the content 
of the law carries weight in most parties’ deliberations.112 Nor can proof be required 
of all affected parties. Courts cannot feasibly delineate the temporal boundaries of 
laws according to who placed reliance upon them. There is no certainty if law is one 
thing for some people at one point in time, and the opposite for others at the very 
same point in time. It would be contrary to the principles of generality and equal 
justice to hold that non-retrospectivity “protects those who know and rely on the law 
but is inapplicable to those who do not”.113  
So perhaps the better approach is, on the other hand, a constructive standard of 
reliance. That is, that the presumption against retrospectivity protects peoples’ 
reasonable ability to rely on the old rule. Andrew Nicol seems to endorse this 
approach: that a case precedent should be overruled with only prospective effect “if 
a reasonable man would have relied on the case in question”.114 This leaves it to 
judges to infer reliance and expectation interests generally. That is no small task. 
Epistemically, we cannot know the extent to which everyone’s expectations are 
frustrated by judicial decisions. Generalisations can be perilous.115 Moreover, the 
premise that people expect laws upon which they act to remain static is itself dubious. 
People may well expect the contrary. As Lady Justice Arden observed in Lymington 
Marina Ltd v MacNamara, informed parties understand “that both statute law and 
the common law develop over time”.116 Since the law is always in “a process of 
structured development”, no precedent is ultimately immutable.117 People who are 
properly advised can be expected to account in their dealings for the risk of 
112 Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), p.44; see L. Smith, “The Rationality of Tradition” in T. Endicott, J. Getzler 
and E. Peel (eds), Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
p.311.
113 Juratowitch (fn.33 above), p.47.  
114 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.544; see Juratowitch (fn.33 above), pp.47-49; IRAL Response (fn.5 above), pp.29-
30. 
115 Freeman, “Standards” (fn.58 above), p.186. 
116 MacNamara (fn.104 above), [33].  
117 Weiler (fn.9 above), p.32.  
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developments or departures in precedent. Reliance and expectation interests may not, 
ultimately, be sufficiently generalisable to warrant non-retrospectivity.  
A second problem concerns whether non-retrospectivity is reserved to protect the 
reliance interests of parties, or only of affected defendants, or of society or societal 
institutions generally. The argument for prospective overruling seems most 
compelling when all of the parties to the dispute had relied on a rule. Non-
retrospectivity of an overruling would seem to respect their autonomy. That was the 
position in Spectrum Plus: the parties to the debenture agreement thought that it had 
secured a fixed charge over book debts.118 It was third party preferential creditors 
who contested this view. Those creditors’ ultimate success suggests that the interests 
of third parties can outweigh contracting parties’ own mutual reliance interests. In 
the advocates’ immunity litigation, on the other hand, the reliance interests of the 
parties were at odds:119 the defendant lawyers relied on the advocates’ immunity 
rule,120 while the claimant clients relied on the common law principle that those 
engaged for their professional skill owe a duty of care.121 Reliance interests were said 
to weigh in favour of the defendants, though the claimants were held to have the 
better argument. Yet, when the parties’ reliance interests are at odds, why should the 
reliance interests of the losing party prevail over the “better rule” relied upon by the 
other party?122 Where a (losing) side’s reliance interests were not sufficiently 
compelling to keep a court from “changing the law” in the first place, the other 
(winning) side’s reliance interests will tend to provide the court a compelling reason 
to apply the judgment in the ordinary retrospective way. Further complicating the 
question of whose reliance is relevant, it has been suggested that institutional reliance 
carries weight: that prospective overruling may be necessary to help judicial, 
118 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above). 
119 Simons (fn.36 above); Chamberlains (fn.45 above). 
120 As established in Rondel (fn.53 above). 
121 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465 (HL) 502-503. 
122 See Palmer and Sampford (fn.103 above), pp.175-183.  
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administrative, or governmental institutions to transition from the old to the new 
rule.123 This argument, though, opens the door to non-retrospectivity being employed 
in spite of, rather than because of, the parties’ own reliance and expectation interests. 
Finally, at what point in time is reliance to be assessed? Are we concerned with 
reliance at the time of the parties’ transaction, at the time of dispute and litigation, or 
at the time of judicial decision? The natural inclination is to assess reliance at the 
transaction-time. The law that the parties reasonably expected to apply at the time 
they transacted should prevail. This means that when it can be anticipated at the time 
from the weight of obiter dicta or commentary that some rule, such as the mistake-
of-law bar,124 is likely to be overruled, the parties should not benefit from reliance 
on it. For “a party could hardly make a plausible case for reliance on the basis of an 
already dubious precedent”.125 Similarly, in cases where a rule was challenged by 
one party from the outset, prospective overruling would seem unsuitable. Where, for 
instance, a taxpayer paid the Revenue pursuant to a taxing provision while 
simultaneously challenging the vires of that provision in court, we would probably 
not infer mutual reliance on that law so as to warrant non-retrospectivity of any 
ultimate finding that the provision was, indeed, ultra vires.126 But then, should it 
make a difference if the taxpayer only decided to challenge the tax provision at some 
future point in time still within the limitation period? Surely not.127 Assent to 
payment at the time of a transaction does not normally undermine one’s right to bring 
a timely challenge or claim over it in the future. Peoples’ reliance and expectation 
interests can evolve over time, often for varied and complex reasons. One of the 
advantages of adversarial litigation is its tendency to hone the issues and competing 
123 See sections C and E below.  
124 See Kleinwort Benson (fn.17 above). 
125 R.J. Traynor, “Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility” (1976) 28 
Hastings L.J. 533, 565.  
126 See Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Comrs [1993] A.C. 70 (HL); Kingstreet 
Investments Ltd v New Brunswick 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3.  
127 See FII Test Claimants No.2 (fn.63 above), overruling Deutsche Morgan (fn.87 above). 
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arguments before the court. It does not serve the adjudicative process to ignore 
subsequent developments and legal arguments merely because they were not 
envisaged or raised by the parties at the time of the transaction in dispute.  
These three tensions—between actual versus constructive reliance, the 
contestable nature of claims to reliance, and the tendency of reliance interests to shift 
over time—reveal the malleability of the reliance value. While reliance may be a 
“core” reason for courts to refrain from overruling, it offers no firm foundation on 
which to construct novel temporal limits on the effects of such overruling.  
C. Efficiency of Judicial Institutions
Prospective overruling can expand flexibility in the judicial role. It seemingly
avoids several costs of judicial law-making. By protecting entitlements in the past 
from change, law-changing courts shield parties from retrospective windfalls and 
wipeouts in regard to their past conduct.128 Courts can focus on setting rules that 
optimally deter undesirable conduct without repercussions for those past actions over 
which it is too late to intervene.129 They can set aside the cost of retrospectivity when 
assessing the value of innovation for the future.130 By unshackling the retrospective 
consequences, prospective overruling frees judges to engage in more ambitious and 
creative decision-making. In sum, “the major benefit or detriment of the doctrine 
(depending on one’s point of view) is its capacity to encourage judicial activism”.131 
This description alone may cause many to recoil from the technique.132 But even 
if we embrace judicial activism there are reasons to be sceptical of non-retrospective 
judicial law-making. Freeman identifies problems of representation in the use of the 
128 Blackshield (fn.30 above), pp.204, 227; Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), pp.144-145. 
129 K. Mason (fn.77 above), p.530.  
130 L.L. Jaffe, English and American Judges as Lawmakers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.56.  
131 K. Mason (fn.77 above), p.531; see Friedland (fn.58 above), p.171; Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), pp.37, 
47; Zhuang (fn.42 above), p.621.  
132 But see IRAL Response (fn.5 above), pp.11, 28-30 (embracing the technique). 
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technique arising from the separation of the courts’ adjudicatory and law-making 
roles.133 If counsel orient their arguments and evidence toward the resolution of their 
clients’ dispute, the judge may be under-informed as to the implications of changing 
the law only for the future. Alternatively, if prospective law-making becomes the 
focus, counsel will have to give submissions on matters that may have nothing to do 
with their clients’ circumstances. Further, those whose rights and duties are actually 
impacted by the law-change will typically not be represented in the litigation. Under 
such conditions a court may overlook important considerations in forming its 
decision. Nicol concedes that that this “danger does exist”, but not in all cases.134 It 
will usually be in defendants’ interests to argue both against a rule-change and 
against any change applying retrospectively. Institutional or representative litigants 
will also typically argue cases with an eye to the future. Further, third party 
interveners can weigh in on polycentric cases—although group litigation is itself a 
fraught and controversial practice.135 What is clear is that use of the technique will 
tend to exacerbate divisions between the interests of plaintiff and defendant, third 
parties, and non-parties. Courts inclined toward non-retrospectivity should bear in 
mind the invariably complex and expansive implications of their prospective law-
making.  
A second worry is that courts may more readily overrule if unshackled from 
retrospective repercussions. More overruling would, in turn, fuel more petitions for 
judicial law-making. The volume of litigation would go up. A cycle of judicial 
activism would lead to more uncertainty and inefficiency, not less.136 Nicol dismisses 
this concern: recognition of prospective overruling would not cause judges to 
133 Freeman, “Standards” (fn.58 above), pp.186, 206; Freeman, Jurisprudence (fn.69 above), p.1536; see 
Mackay (fn.80 above), pp.306-307.  
134 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.548.  
135 C. Harlow, “Public Law and Popular Justice” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 1, 8-18. 
136 cf R.A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
pp.358-362.  
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“indulge in a legislative field day”.137 The evidence so far seems to agree. Since Lord 
Simon first expressed curiosity of the technique in 1972,138 the senior judges of the 
UK have not found any occasion to utilise prospective overruling outright.139 This is 
despite the House of Lords in Spectrum Plus preserving the possibility of doing so 
and despite express statutory provision of a judicial discretion to remove or limit the 
retrospective effects of judgments concerning devolved powers.140  
This jurisprudential prudence raises the question of what the technique is being 
reserved for. Lord Scott in Spectrum Plus conjectured that it would never be proper 
to apply the technique to the interpretation of statutes.141 A court that has ascertained 
the correct construction of a statute should apply that interpretation to all cases that 
come before it. It takes only a small step to conclude that courts should act similarly 
in construing and applying common law rules.142 Yet, it is said to be a wise judicial 
precept to “never say never”, and so prospective overruling remains reserved for 
exceptional future cases.143 This reservation is not as prudent as it appears.144 Never-
say-never can create false hope and uncertainty. False hope may foster petitions for 
exceptional relief that are doomed to fail. Uncertainty may cause needless litigation 
and excessive argumentation over the temporality of rules and remedies that could 
otherwise be settled. Uncertainty is especially troublesome given the context of non-
retrospectivity: it generates uncertainty about the very nature of the judicial method. 
The efficiency of judicial institutions generally is sacrificed by preserving a 
137 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.555. 
138 Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] A.C. 944 (HL) 1026. 
139 See Germany v Hughes [2009] EWHC 279 (Admin) [10]. It is a misconception that Green J applied the 
doctrine in R (British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors Musicians’ Union) v Secretary of State 
[2015] EWHC 2041 (Admin). He did not: ibid at [19]-[21].  
140 See Rodger (fn.57 above), pp.77-78; Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [17] per Lord Nicholls. 
141 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [127]; see Samsoondar (fn.17 above), [13]; cf IRAL Response (fn.5 above), 
pp.11, 28-30. 
142 P.S. Atiyah, “Judges and Policy” (1980) 15 Isr. L. Rev. 346, 356; cf J. Grant, “Unconstitutional 
Interpretation” (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 627, 646-649.  
143 Spectrum Plus (fn.17 above), [41] per Lord Nicholls. 
144 cf Burrows (fn.1 above), pp.550-551.  
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technique that only facially delivers efficient resolution of individual cases. 
D. Dignity and Good Repute of Judicial Institutions
A fourth value that influences the temporality of novel precedent concerns the
public perception of the judicial role: the “image of justice”.145 A well-rehearsed, but 
weak, argument for retrospectivity is that judges are not thought by the public to be, 
and should not be seen to be, law-makers. It is important that the public see the judge 
as an “objective, impartial, erudite and experienced declarer of the law that is”.146 
The disguise of the declaratory theory of adjudication helps to preserve the image of 
the judiciary as above the fray.147 Overt judicial law-making, which prospective 
overruling entails, might engender suspicion of judicial power within democratic 
society.148 This argument is easily attacked by proponents of prospective overruling 
on the grounds that judicial obfuscation is unfeasible,149 dishonest,150 and stifles 
reform initiatives.151 In their estimation, “honesty is the best policy”.152  
Certainly, honesty is a virtue here. But it does not obviously support this 
unorthodox technique. To the contrary, like the notion that judges merely “find” law 
but do not “make” it, the arguments that judges should legislate openly seem to rest 
on “surprisingly simplistic ideas” about the judicial role.153 Patrick Atiyah criticised 
the tendency of judges “to conceal or to minimize the extent of” their creative 
function.154 He warned it smacked of elitism. But Atiyah also criticised the depiction 
145 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.189.  
146 Lord Radcliffe, “The Lawyer and his Times” in Not in Feather Beds (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968), 
p.271; see Freeman, “Standards” (fn.58 above), p.204; Mackay (fn.80 above), p.306.
147 Devlin (fn.84 above), p.11. 
148 Mackay (fn.80 above), p.307; Coper (fn.52 above), pp.567, 572-573.  
149 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.188; Atiyah (fn.142 above), p.357; Nicol (fn.9 above), p.551. 
150 K. Mason (fn.77 above), p.530; Lloyd (fn.105 above), p.857.  
151 Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), p.37; Traynor (fn.125 above), p.542.  
152 J.J. Doyle, “Judicial Law Making—Is Honesty the Best Policy?” (1995) 17 Adel. L. Rev. 161.  
153 Atiyah (fn.142 above), p.367; see e.g. Chamberlains (fn.45 above), [136]; Hislop (fn.63 above), [93]. 
154 Atiyah (fn.142 above), p.365.  
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of the judicial law-maker as one who can “cast off all fetters and do what he thinks 
is right”.155 The law-making function of judges is far more nuanced: “[t]o recognise 
that the judge has a creative role does not imply that he can create exactly what he 
pleases”.156 Judges should be honest about their role. But honesty entails being 
forthright about the complex considerations that fetter judicial discretion and that 
constrain judicial law-making. When judges overrule precedent they must disavow 
the simplistic notion that their judgment merely replaces one stable rule with another. 
They should explain the law that governs the parties’ dispute and show that it is being 
applied even-handedly.157 Otherwise, the parties and the public may suspect that the 
judicial method is arbitrary. That would certainly undermine the dignity and good 
repute of the judiciary.158  
E. Efficiency of Administrative or Legislative Action
Administrability and floodgates arguments are advanced in favour of curbing the
retrospective effects of judge-made law. Non-retrospectivity is said to be necessary 
to protect the interests both of government and the public generally who can only 
follow the law as it is understood at the time they act.159 It allows time for officials 
and individuals to adjust to new rules.160 Consider, for instance, the judicial quashing 
of a taxing provision or practice. This can be exceptionally disruptive. The loss of a 
source of fiscal support can impact government accounts and forecasts, budgets and 
spending plans, Revenue officer training and conduct, and the legislative agenda. If 
the Crown is additionally held liable in restitution for taxes paid under the invalid 
155 Atiyah (fn.142 above), p.367; see Lloyd (fn.105 above), p.859. 
156 Atiyah (fn.142 above), p.368.  
157 Mackay (fn.80 above), p.306; Hodge (fn.15 above), pp.214, 221. 
158 Jaffey, “Two Ways” (fn.14 above), p.459.  
159 Stone, Precedent (fn.8 above), p.189; Joseph, “Prospective Overruling” (fn.44 above), pp.144-145; see 
IRAL Response (fn.5 above), pp.28-29; cf E. Campbell, “The Retrospectivity of Judicial Decisions and the 
Legality of Governmental Acts” (2003) 29 Monash U. L. Rev. 49, 74-84.  
160 K. Mason (fn.77 above), p.530; Choudhry and Roach (fn.61 above), p.219. 
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law, the “disruptive potential becomes severe”.161 Similar concerns may be raised by 
private parties when a judicial overruling seems to interfere with the basis of 
completed commercial transactions. Prospective overruling, it is said, is needed to 
avoid “administrative chaos”.162  
One implication of this argument seems to be that claims against government 
warrant unique judicial treatment. That is dubious. The bending of judicial method 
to administrability concerns is prima facie an affront to constitutional norms. A.V. 
Dicey famously proclaimed that in England (and her Commonwealth), all classes 
and every official—“from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of 
taxes”—are to be equally subject to the ordinary law of the land.163 Prospective 
overruling violates this ideal by exempting the Crown from ordinary liability in the 
name of efficiency and administrability. It essentially turns the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations on its head by privileging the interests of government above individual 
claimants.164  
The administrability and floodgates concerns over judicial retrospectivity are not 
compelling. When a regulatory provision is held to be ultra vires and quashed, why 
should the affected individuals bear the burden of the drafter’s error as opposed to 
taxpayers as a whole?165 If selective prospective overruling comes to be endorsed, 
will floodgates concerns not be exacerbated by the resultant incentives to file 
precautionary claims whenever someone challenges a rule before the courts? Cries 
of fiscal chaos seem overwrought. We know from experience that tax laws have been 
disapplied by courts while upholding “colossal” claims for restitution of past paid 
161 J. Lovell, “From Now On: Temporal Issues in Constitutional Adjudication (2005) 18 Nat. J. Const. L. 
17, 41.  
162 M. Zander, The Law-making Process, 7th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp.379; see Blackshield 
(fn.30 above), p.228; Hall (fn.27 above), p.104.  
163 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 3rd edn (London: MacMillan & Co, 
1889), p.181; see Beswick, “Rule of Law” (fn.81 above), p.275. 
164 cf G. Weeks, “What Can We Legitimately Expect from the State?” in M. Groves and G. Weeks (eds), 
Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), pp.147-164. 
165 Kingstreet Investments (fn.126 above), [28] per Bastarache J. 
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taxes without resort to non-retrospectivity.166 The sky has not fallen. In practice, the 
extensive scope of some novel liability can be curbed through procedural-bars, time-
bars, and other defences.  
In a democracy functioning with checks and balances it is inapposite, and 
unnecessary, for courts to be swayed by speculative policy implications when 
adjudicating rights of action.167 Courts typically are not well equipped to cost 
projected administrative and fiscal chaos. The other branches of government, on the 
other hand, are. Legislatures can, and do, intervene when the repercussions of judicial 
law-making are considered to be too burdensome.168 The directly democratically 
accountable branches of government are best placed to weigh the public policy 
considerations for and against limiting judicially determined rights. It is not 
implausible to expect legislatures to intervene in this way.169 An example from New 
Zealand illustrates the point. In 2014, the Social Security Appeal Authority of New 
Zealand identified an error in how the Government had been interpreting legislation 
concerning from when benefit entitlements should be paid.170 It had gone unnoticed 
for 17 years that beneficiaries were being underpaid by one day’s benefit. The cost 
of retrospective redress was estimated at around $6 million per year. Should the 
Appeal Authority’s decision not have operated retrospectively? The courts certainly 
would have been criticised if they had afforded the decision prospective-only effect. 
Instead, the issue was taken out of their hands. Parliament intervened by passing 
legislation amending the Social Security Act retroactively to instate the previously 
understood interpretation of the Act, leaving past affected beneficiaries without a 
166 FII Test Claimants No.2 (fn.63 above), [9]; see Beswick, “Roadblocked” (fn.3 above), pp.1119-1120. 
167 Mackay (fn.80 above), p.306.  
168 A. Mason, “Legislative and Judicial Law-Making: Can We Locate an Identifiable Boundary?” (2003) 24 
Adel. L. Rev. 15, 33-34; Campbell (fn.159 above), pp.82-83. Constitutional rules may curb the scope of 
retroactive legislation in some cases: see C. Mitchell, “End of the Road for the Overpaid Tax Litigation?” (2017-
18) 9 U.K.S.C. Yrbk 1, 8-9. There should, however, be no absolute bar on retroactive legislation, especially in
the context of hard cases: Fuller (fn.40 above), pp.44, 53-54; Himsworth (fn.31 above), pp.169-170.
169 cf Tur, “Varieties” (fn.9 above), p.36, and Hall (fn.27 above), p.104. 
170 Re Benefits Review Committee [2014] NZSSAA 39. 
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remedy.171 For many, that was an unsavoury result. But that is the point. It is better 
that the legislature weathers the reputational fallout of curbing judicial-recognised 
rights than do the courts.172  
F. Equality of Treatment for Like Cases
It is a well-established requirement of formal justice “that we treat like cases
alike, and different cases differently, and give to everyone his due”.173 The 
expectation of equality is that the same rules should apply to materially similar 
incidents. So new judicial rules should govern all cases justiciable before the courts, 
regardless of when those cases arose. Proponents of prospective overruling argue, 
contrariwise, that the technique allows courts to treat truly like cases alike. Nicol 
contends that when two materially similar incidents are divided in time by the 
issuance of a novel precedent courts may be justified in treating the two cases 
differently. That is because the court’s new rule is a significant event for the parties. 
Before the judgment was handed down “reliance on the old decision was justified; 
afterwards, it was not”.174 On this account, equality does not compel the application 
of “new” rules to “old” disputes litigated before the courts.  
The equality value can be invoked, at most, in support of the pure understanding 
of the technique. Clearly, equality is violated by selective prospective overruling.175 
But even in its pure form the value of equality is not decisive as to the temporal scope 
of “new” rules. Ordinarily, justiciable cases (i.e. cases that are not procedurally 
171 Social Security (Commencement of Benefits) Amendment Act 2015, No.113 (NZ) (repealed with 
prospective-only effect by Social Security Act 2018, No.32, ss.66 and 455(1)).  
172 C. Forsyth, “The Rock and the Sand: Jurisdiction and Remedial Discretion” (2013) 18 Jud. Rev. 360, 
374; see AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 86, [93] per Lord Mance, 
[121] and [132] per Lord Reed.
173 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.73;
Sharpe (fn.10 above), p.78. 
174 Nicol (fn.9 above), p.547; cf Part III(B)’s argument that reliance on a rule of law is not justified as a 
matter of course until overruled. Rather, overruling occurs because reliance on some rule has become unjustified. 
175 See Part II(A) above. 
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barred or time-barred) are decided according to the court’s best understanding of the 
governing law. Proponents of prospective overruling would have it that a claimant 
injured one day before a relevant novel precedent is handed down should be subject 
to different rules than an otherwise identical claimant who suffers the same kind of 
injury one day after the precedent is handed down. The claimants may have had no 
awareness of the state of the law when they were injured. Though prima facie both 
would have timely claims over their injuries—injuries separated by only two days—
only the latter claimant’s case would be subject to the new precedent. Far from 
respecting the principle of equality, courts violate the principle when they treat 
otherwise-comparable hard cases differently on the basis of the “entirely fortuitous” 
timing at which some novel judgment is handed down.176 The principle of equality 
is best understood to weigh against drawing “invidious and unjust distinctions” 
within justiciable claims.177  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the instrumental values that are commonly corralled in support 
of the prospective overruling technique—stability, reliance, efficiency, dignity, and 
equality—unravel under scrutiny. Properly understood, these values affirm the 
retrospectivity of judge-made law. That judges can be seen to make law 
retrospectively is no cause for alarm. When we recognise that judicial law-making is 
inextricably bound up with the resolution of past disputes we can see how the 
adjudicatory context constrains judicial law-making. Novel judgments represent the 
court’s considered understanding of the law that governed the parties’ dispute at the 
time it arose. Because a judgment provides precedent for resolving disputes future, 
present, and past, judicial creativity is tempered by “the danger of disturbing 
176 Mackay (fn.80 above), p.305; see B. Juratowitch, “Questioning Prospective Overruling” [2007] N.Z. L. 
Rev. 393, 409.  
177 cf K. Mason (fn.77 above), pp.530-531. 
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retrospectively the basis” of past transactions.178 By contrast, prospective overruling 
purports to untether judicial law-making from the past so as to free judges to engage 
in untrammelled legislating. It is the ultimate instrument of judicial activism. It is for 
this reason that the High Court of Australia rejected the doctrine as inimical to the 
judicial method, holding:  
A hallmark of the judicial process has long been the making of binding 
declarations of rights and obligations arising from the operation of the law upon 
past events or conduct. The adjudication of existing rights and obligations as 
distinct from the creation of rights and obligations distinguishes the judicial 
power from non-judicial power. Prospective overruling is thus inconsistent with 
judicial power on the simple ground that the new regime that would be ushered 
in when the overruling took effect would alter existing rights and obligations. 
If an earlier case is erroneous and it is necessary to overrule it, it would be a 
perversion of judicial power to maintain in force that which is acknowledged 
not to be the law.179 
As to the disruptive effects of novel precedent, there is often a tendency toward 
exaggeration. Retrospective judicial law-making does not disrupt transactions for all 
time in the past. The law already draws a principled line between justiciable cases 
and those closed off by time-bars, defences, and procedural limits.180 Such doctrines 
implement a requirement of the rule of law “that the past be settled”.181 Prospective 
overruling is simply superfluous. Moreover, whether disruptive consequences are too 
onerous is ultimately a policy question that courts are not well-placed to assess. To 
the extent that the ordinary retrospective effect of a judicial decision must be 
curtailed, the answer is tailored retroactive legislation. The politically accountable 
arm of the state is better placed to weather the public fallout of naked policy-making 
than is the independent judiciary.  
178 Practice Statement (fn.16 above). 
179 Ha v New South Wales [1997] HCA 34, (1997) 189 C.L.R. 465, 504 (internal citations omitted), aff’d 
Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow [2019] HCA 29, [55], [94]-[98].  
180 Blackshield (fn.30 above), pp.186-187; Campbell (fn.159 above), pp.51, 65; Lovell (fn.161 above), p.34; 
Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (fn.3 above), pp.345-363.  
181 A. Ripstein, “The Rule of Law and Time’s Arrow” in L.M. Austin and D. Klimchuk (eds), Private 
Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.306.  
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If judges and policymakers are minded to dabble in unorthodox juridical crafts, 
they must at least present a plausible rationale. On the issue examined in this article 
the rationale is found wanting. Prospective overruling is an injudicious instrument.  
